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Intellectuals in the post-Medieval West, striving for scholarly emancipation, developed 
methodologies to target so as to free themselves from the dominant Christian, largely Roman 
Catholic, intellectual tradition. Machiavelli was one such critic, calling for the repristination 
of pre-Christian classics. Such methodologies are never without an inherent quest for 
power. Machiavelli developed a Classicist, ‘heroic exemplar’ hermeneutic in order to extol 
the republicanist, manly, ferocious, imperialist virtues of Rome, vis-à-vis the divisive, meek, 
caring, justice-seeking, unpatriotic, Christian leaders of his day. He therefore initiated Modern 
ideological militaristic competitiveness with its mutually suspicious balance of powers 
practices. This article forms part of a series of articles on methodologies of targeting groups.
Anticipating ideological modernity
As part of a wider study, which could be entitled: presuppositional philosophical apologetics 
from a Christian perspective, I have engaged in studying philosophical critiques of and attacks 
on Christianity, initially focused on the criticisms presented by William James [1913], Niccolò 
Machiavelli and Voltaire. In terms of a presuppositional analysis (an ontological transcendental 
critique), I have attempted to uncover the trench and the angle from which the salvos came. In 
the available Western primary literature since the Renaissance, different forms of Christianity 
(especially Catholicism) have often been targeted by philosophers. In a superficial reading of these 
texts, Christians may tend to counter the attacks by criticising the ‘facts’ presented: Christians 
have killed so many people during the Crusades, the witch-hunts, and so forth. 
What appears to be neglected is exactly the uncovering of the trenches and angles: the 
presuppositions and perspectives that carry the attacks. Especially forgotten here is the type 
of telescopic sight used to aim at the target. Westerners have a special respect for method and 
technique; they tend to view them as innocent means to be used to reach one’s goals, as if neither 
one’s worldview nor one’s aims have any influence on the internal structure of the means, 
whether apparatus, plans, procedures or recipes. One of the most common of perspectives is the 
present adage of the pro-gun lobby: ‘Guns do not kill people; people kill people.’ 
My purpose in this article is to focus the presuppositional apologetics exactly on the technical side 
of criticisms of Christianity – guns are structured to kill or maim. Certain critical methodologies – 
such as that of William James or Voltaire or Machiavelli – have been structured in such a way that 
Christianity in particular is targeted. My argument will be that the principles behind Machiavelli’s 
ontology, his philosophical anthropology, his view of society and especially of scholarship, led 
him to structure his scholarly method in such a format that Christians could not but emerge from 
his analysis as the villains of society. In short, the method is prejudiced because the designer of the 
method was prejudiced. 
In a thoroughgoing article entitled ‘Outlines of a deontology of scientific method’, Stoker (1970) 
analyses the norms relevant to scholarly methods. One of the important norms he points to is 
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Teikenmetodologieë – Renaissance militarisme val die Christendom as ‘swakheid’ aan. 
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that methods, being plans, have to be structured such that 
they reach the goals of scholarship. This, of course, implies 
that in specific cases the methods have to be structured 
so that the specific aims of the investigation are reached 
– guns have been structured as technical means to certain 
ends. In war, the position of the marksmen (their trench or 
starting point), the angle from which they aim (positional 
perspective), the position of the enemy, are all determinants 
of the efficiency of the attack. All of these converge in the 
plan and thus in the efficiency of execution. A complete 
method can never be reduced to the technical apparatus, 
but if the barrel of the gun is crooked, all other skills will be 
in vain. Thus the aim of the gun has to be structured into the 
gun – it is a necessary condition for the efficient execution 
of the total plan. 
In my analysis of William James, Voltaire and here also 
of Machiavelli, I have found that their (quite important) 
critiques of Christianity have been prejudiced to a serious 
extent. Thus one finds attacks on Christian viciousness 
(Voltaire), Christian inefficient meekness (James) and the 
fairness and just actions of Christian leaders (Machiavelli). 
The fact that these criticisms clearly contradict one another 
in some respects shows that the facts of the matter (at least 
those taken into account) have not been decisive for the 
judgements made.
Methods are artefacts, determined from two sides: the 
objective and the subjective. On the objective side the field of 
study has a decisive role: one can study a physical object by 
hitting it with a hammer, but hitting a poem with a hammer 
will not tell us anything about the meaning of the poem. I do 
realise that there is a bond between the two fields: studying 
the physical properties of the material the poem is written on 
may help us to date the poem and therefore help us to find 
the lingual context of the words. The structure of the method 
will have to reflect the nature of the field of study. 
On the subjective side, in scholarship (and probably in 
general), the aims are usually determined by problems 
experienced or changes to be made. Whereas specialised 
animals are at home in some environments and not in others, 
the human being is fairly unspecialised and therefore – to 
a certain extent – a misfit in every environment. ‘Culture’, 
including ‘planning’, is humankind’s way of coping with this 
apparent misfit: the human being changes the environment 
to a large extent in order to be at ease and at peace in it.1 Karl 
Jaspers would say that God speaks in secret code in order to 
set us free and let us do the decoding as the situation directs 
us. Modernity has read ‘providence’ (‘nature’) as coercing 
us to become lords and owners of nature autonomously, for 
own advantage (Venter 2012a:ch. 5; 2012b:chs. 3, 4, 5). 
1.Modernity, as it became more secularised, provided all kinds of naturalistic 
explanations for this incongruence between humankind and environment. Turgot 
and Kant transformed ‘providence’ into ‘nature’. ‘Nature’ then becomes the motor 
force to push humankind beyond paradisiacal animalism (the fitting environment 
of the animal) into an inimical world with infinite possibilities and lots of suffering 
for the sake of finding itself as the rational summit of progress. The misfit is thus 
open-ended and has in fact to build up itself autonomously. In Irrationalism this 
doctrine of postponed rationality becomes the doctrine of continuously postponed 
and situationally recovered essence of the open-ended, autonomous human being.
This latter view shows the subjective determinant of 
Modern methodologies: our deepest trust relationships and 
foundational beliefs will co-determine the structures of our 
plans. Humans have aims regarding their environment. Since 
Pico in the Renaissance, the belief has been cultivated that 
humankind has to take responsibility for its own essence. The 
environment includes other human beings whom we may 
regard as not having realised as much of their humanness as 
we have, or who may be seen as obstructing the realisation 
of the full potential of all or part of humanity. How are plans 
evolved with regard to groups of belief systems that seem 
obstructive of another group’s ideas of the direction the 
‘world’ has to take? The power of the planning group will 
come into play here: again, this will be a determinant of the 
structure of the method. 
I have mentioned the basis of Modernity, an ontology of 
mastery and appropriation and human self-advantaging. 
Modernity did not come about by a Copernican revolution 
in which all old ideas suddenly disappeared and totally new 
ones emerged. It rather came about by continuous bends and 
recombining Ancient and Medieval ideas that created new 
growth during the Renaissance and early Modernity. One of 
the central shifts was a reaction against Christianity as taught 
and practised by especially the Roman Catholic Church. 
Towards Middle Modernity, after the Reformation had 
established itself, Lutheranism and the Reformed tradition 
also became targets (e.g. in De Saint-Simon’s [1825] Nouveau 
Christianisme). 
For now my focus is on Machiavelli. Not only was he quite 
influential in this area, but many of his own ideas are clear 
anticipations of Modern attitudes towards Christianity. 
Machiavelli as proto-Modern critic 
of Christianity
Machiavelli (1469–1527) is one of the most outstanding 
examples of antipathy towards Christian goodness. He 
was a Renaissance classicist, oriented very much towards 
the military cultures of Sparta and Rome. His attitude 
was that of ‘repristination’, that is, to recover the Classical 
Age in its pristine form. Antipathy towards Christianity 
constructed as a scholarly methodology has a long history. 
All too often this antipathy has been part of civility since the 
Renaissance. Unexpectedly, Christians have been attacked, 
not for the outrages of the Crusaders, the popes or the church 
hierarchies, the witch-hunts and so forth but: for being such 
nice people: peaceful, fair and caring.
Intellectuals tend to focus on what other intellectuals say or do 
not say. Machiavelli, like William James, confused theological 
doctrine with religious practice, even though expressions 
such as ‘strength to suffer’ indicate that Machiavelli may 
have had a somewhat deeper understanding of Christian 
practice (see Venter 2013). 
However, he should have taken the mendicant friars 
and the Franciscans more seriously. Christians who have 
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the strength to suffer are in fact people of action and 
determination. They are prepared to serve in circumstances 
of suffering; to suffer with those who suffer. Strength in 
suffering is not an end in itself; martyrdom is not something 
to be sought after; it is imposed by the powerful who fear 
those attempting to fulfil their calling to justice and care 
(Overduin n.d.: 7ff.). 
As with all worldviews, Christianity has its deviants. I do 
not believe it has more devious people than any other belief 
system. The truth of the matter, however, is that in South 
Africa charismatic Christians, sometimes ridiculed for their 
literal use of the Bible and for their sentimentalism, have 
been doing and spending much more for the sake of the poor 
than the pretentious left-wing government. 
One could also say that James was a late-ideologue and 
Machiavelli an early-ideologue. Calling them ‘post-’ and 
‘pre-’ ideologues would imply a ‘having left behind’ and ‘a 
not yet’, as in ‘post-’ and ‘pre-Modern’ (see Venter 2013). This 
actually implies a neglect of historical continuity. A historical 
shift implies continuity.2 If ideology is a phenomenon of 
Modernity, then in many ways James (with other Pragmatists, 
supposedly a grandpa of ‘Post-Modernism’) is late-Modern 
and Machiavelli, being early-Modern, provides anticipations 
of his views. 
They shared the form or format of ideology – end-driven 
strategic thinking without ado. Machiavelli (followed by 
Hobbes [1946], Rousseau, Voltaire and all supporters of the 
French Revolution, and also Kant to a certain extent) adopted 
the Ancient pagan tribalist view of the state. Regarding the 
latter as a new ‘encompassing whole’, they had no patience 
with people who would not serve their divinity. Rousseau 
(DCS, Bk IV:ch. 8) really denigrated the meekness of this 
international religion, Christianity, as untrustworthiness, as 
did Nietzsche a century later (GM, Erste Abhandlung:7). 
Machiavelli anticipated Modernity up to and including late 
Modernity, for that matter: he developed many doctrines 
that have been absorbed into Modern intellectual culture. 
In fact, his teaching is often quite near to what is called 
‘Post-Modernism’. The latter pretends to have emptied out 
all doctrine, leaving only the empty shell of procedures – 
template-like technical science in which means follow upon 
means – the ends being hidden. In their denial of grand 
(ideological) causes, they still serve hidden Modern norms. 
The early-Modern Machiavelli and the late-Modern James, 
for example, share: 
2.‘Ideology’ is rooted in Modern forms of Neo-Platonism but has developed beyond 
it. In Plato, ideas were ontic absolutes, a world in themselves, that determine the 
earthly world in a mimetic sense. In Modernity, Ideas have become subjective 
absolutes and a universal transcendental subject had to be construed as arguing 
for the universality of these Ideas. Ideology came into being as elitist claims to 
have insight into these governing universal Ideas, especially the idea of ‘freedom’ 
(more or less in the vicinity of Hegel and Fichte). Within the naturalistic inversions 
of Idealism, a shift occurred: the ‘Ideas’ became determining historical causes led 
by the final cause of human progress. Ends became inevitable laws, led by this or 
that group, absorbing others into the struggle for the ‘cause’. A final cause still has 
clear contents. As the faith in progress collapsed, the final cause disappeared with 
its content and the intermediate causes remained (apparently without content). 
Thus the form, presented as method remains: one has to restate ends upon ends. 
This means the subject, whether social or individual, remains in search of ends. The 
struggle for the cause, as before, remains and, as before, it is by and large a struggle 
for the cause of the powerful. 
•	 A trust in method that supposedly will guarantee 
finding both the correct way and the road to the good 
life – Renaissance pre-Modernity and Irrationalist late-
Modernity are both located in the continuity of Western 
intellectual history.
•	 A distrust of Christian voluntary kindness, given its practical 
inefficiency (each in terms of his own expectations of an 
efficient or effective doctrine). 
•	 A strong belief in a strictly ‘empirical scientific’ approach, 
even though their ideas of the ‘empirical’ may differ. 
Machiavelli put his trust in historiography, taking the old 
narratives as empirical evidence; James was a bit more 
playful in experimenting and observation. 
•	 A deep conviction that conceptual work had to find its 
real fulfilment in practical activity and change, James 
from a subjectivistic pragmatist perspective, Machiavelli 
from an (apparently) objectivistic practicistic3 viewpoint. 
•	 A situationistic (local) focus – doctrines had to work in 
specific situations, and to a certain extent the situation, 
being problematic, was given a prescriptive role. But the 
difference in conception here is strong, bound up as it is 
with the historical position of each. Machiavelli believed 
in a fixed world cycle, which supposedly made replication 
of earlier events possible – a pre-Rationalist Aristotelian 
scientism – whereas James supposed an experimental 
trial-and-error process to find what works best – a post-
Positivist scientism where laws, as expressed in rules, 
were but approximations. 
The most important shared conception between Machiavelli and 
James is this: Machiavelli provides an early-ideological anticipatory 
approximation (not much clear content yet), whereas James presents 
us with a late-ideological, formalistic, methodological emptiness. 
Machiavelli was quite clear about his favoured faraway ends: 
the stability of a republican empire. He was also clear about 
the broad means to reach this: instilling civil virtue in the 
sovereign and replication of its exemplars from the Classical 
era. But given his practicism, the normative content directing 
the methodical execution remains vague. However, basic 
concepts such as ‘civil virtue’ allowed for much leeway and 
left the guiding norms almost empty. 
The broad framework of his method was made clear: compare 
the virtues of Ancient times with the weaknesses of today (the 
fragmentation and instability of Italy as such and Europe at 
large). But with what aim? And according to which criteria 
have the aims been developed?
Civil virtue is the criterion. Let us, as an initial working 
hypothesis, assume that ‘virtue’ indicates a socially acceptable 
moral life, and that ‘civil’ indicates life as a citizen of a political 
3.Three different terms express three different views of the relationship between 
thinking and practical life. Practicism has objectivistic tendencies – it says that we 
can only find truth via practical experience in objective situations; thinking is near 
to remembering the recipe. Practicalism says that rational logic about practical 
situations will make us practical. Fichte went as far as saying that if one is a good 
student of philosophy, then knowing how to cook one’s own meals will follow 
all by itself. Practicalism teaches universal rational plans for similar situations. 
Pragmatism stands near-practicalism in the sense that subjective planning comes 
before application, but there is an interaction: one can force fit the empirical into 
one’s plans, but a shifting reality will force us to renew our plans continuously by 
experimenting. 
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community. One may then infer that for Machiavelli being a 
valuable or useful citizen of a strong political community has 
some supremacy when one has to determine one’s way of 
life and that any supreme norm or value or belief system that 
requires a different loyalty would have to face up to severe 
criticism and even denigration. ‘Civil virtue’ in so many 
different formats in fact became the supreme law for so many 
Modern thinkers (including the liberal individualists) that in 
this respect (as will be unpacked below) Machiavelli was a 
proto-Modern thinker. 
When ‘virtue’ becomes the critical point of difference with 
another group, then surely one will have to identify the 
enemies of virtue and take up a polar extreme position 
against them. The means have to be determined in terms of one’s 
conception of virtue. 
In Machiavelli’s case, virtue meant Romanist republican 
stability as established by manly ferocity (over and against 
Christian meekness) – the precursor of Nietzschean and also 
Fascist virtue. ‘Civil virtue’ – as a formal idea – indicates 
being a useful and loyal citizen in the Roman (and Spartan) 
sense. 
Classicism
Like the majority of later Renaissance thinkers, Machiavelli 
adopted the Classicist position (quite uncritically), defending 
‘virtue’ by playing out the ‘virtue’ of the Classical era against 
the deviations from ‘virtue’ in his own days. As opposed 
to the meek Christians, the pure Classical era was good, he 
believed, given its militaristic ferocity. Some two centuries 
later, Voltaire would swop the characterisations: Classical 
civilisation was not really violent; the Christians have been 
brutal (but that’s for another article). 
Recovering the pristine classics
Renaissance Classicism’s ‘repristination’ was unsuccessful in 
regaining the pristine Ancient Classical; it inverted itself into 
a search for novelty. No repristination can ever be successful: 
the ‘good old days’ can never return; recovered ideas require 
re-thinking. Between the Renaissance and the Ancient 
Classical era about fourteen centuries of Medieval Christianity 
and its intellectual culture, feudal socio-economic structures, 
lords and vassals, popes and priests, had passed by and had 
left consequences. The struggle between pope and emperor, 
between princedoms and republics, between town and gown, 
which Machiavelli attempted to solve, was simply not part 
of the issues in Sparta and Rome. In Machiavelli the ‘newly 
new’ occurred in the method (hermeneutics) of recovering the 
‘oldest old’ – the normal irony of repristination: 
•	 On the one hand, the Renaissance elaborated on the old: 
Cicero, Livius, Ovidius, Neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
Romanism, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, even the 
Pre-Socratics reappeared in so many forms, but the 
contributions of the Middle Ages were wilfully ignored. 
Thus, older issues (such as that of ‘universals’ for 
example) that had been milled and baked to the limits 
during the Middle Ages, were revisited. 
•	 On the other hand, the contributions of the Middle 
Ages did survive in different formats, mostly without 
acknowledgement (the ‘solutions’ of the Middle Ages 
were often endorsed).
Once the adoration of the ‘heroic’ Classical era had taken root, 
every aspect of Ancient culture was idealised or heroicised. 
The Neo-Marxists have often pointed out that good ideas 
easily become oppressive established dogmas. Machiavelli’s 
striving to recover the Roman republic – an empire – was 
an oppressive impossibility – the supposed Spartan and Roman 
belief in a harsh life and permanent struggle for an empire 
was not attractive to Renaissance citizenship; every city had its 
own nationalism. Looking the other way in cases of corruption 
and murder as means to good statesmanship (though 
eclectically refined by Machiavelli) was not attractive either; 
the citizen could not but ask: When is it my turn to become 
the victim?
Quite simply, the structure of the developing ‘Modern’ urban 
society with a new economic system, a growing formalised 
education, political parties, princedoms, technology in 
warfare, the printing and distribution of information, and the 
reformation of the church – none of these was a primary issue 
in Ancient Rome. Machiavelli (1975) himself had already 
begun to theorise free individual market competitiveness 
based on the insatiable appetites of humankind (Disc., II, 2:9), 
thus leaving Rome and Sparta behind. 
Yet Machiavellian Classicism survived in the Italian 
nationalistic scholarly spirit and was revived in the late 19th 
century and early 20th century in the form of Fascism, with 
its militaristic and Roman symbols (Hegel and Nietzsche 
making their contributions to this). The idealisation of 
the Classical era made it difficult to break the shackles of 
Classicism. The struggle to be pristinely Classical dialectically 
included how to be radically new. Machiavelli claimed to have 
a new method for reading the Classics, so that they became 
socially relevant to his own days. 
Adherents of the idea of ‘science for science’s sake’ will find it 
difficult to show really pure examples supporting their belief. 
Machiavelli and others explicitly connected their scholarly 
procedures with extra-scholarly interests for leadership, and 
there were those like Descartes who knowingly withdrew 
from social life. Yet none of them claimed that what they 
had to say had no implications for praxis; in Descartes’s 
case, in fact, the opposite was claimed. One could take up 
a ‘neutralist’ viewpoint in astronomy, as Copernicus seems 
to have done, or in present-day astrophysics, or – in the 
short term – in Kuhnian paradigmatic research. Somewhere, 
however, human purposiveness will surface, and be traceable 
further back in and at the basis of the methodological plan. 
Repristination, then, is home to an inherent dialectic: any attempt 
to go back in time tends to fast track a movement away from the 
past.
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Novelty
In their desire to leave the ‘Christian Middle Ages’ behind 
– a clear purpose based on normative choices – Renaissance 
and early Modern thinkers overstated their claims to novelty, 
often quite ironically: the very old was explicitly recovered as the 
very new. In this respect, method supported the claim: one 
could claim that the very old is brought up to date through 
totally new means. 
Another way to strengthen the idea of originality is to 
play one’s own work out against the generally known, the 
products of one’s contemporaries and of the most recent 
past. The faraway past rests in the shadows of history. 
The sharper one can profile one’s own work over against 
the recent past, the more original it will appear. One can 
strengthen this profile by making one’s contemporaries and 
direct predecessors appear bad, whilst polishing one’s own 
contributions. Machiavelli was a master of this strategy – 
using the supposedly very old whilst pretending to give us 
something radically new; so did Descartes, Voltaire and even 
William James.
Machiavelli represented his procedure as a totally, even a 
dangerously, new way of reading the very old. He presented 
the very old as a new way to cope with contemporary 
problems, because the new is always old and the old always 
new – history (causally understood) can be repeated if the 
(causally understood) correct initiatives are taken. 
Some aspects of Machiavelli’s method can surely be 
characterised as innovations – innovations that served 
his personal Classicist prejudices against Medieval and 
Renaissance Christendom (especially in its Roman Catholic 
form). However, even methodologically he was firmly 
rooted in the Classical era, especially in Aristotle. Even 
though he ascribed the perceptions of dangers in his 
proposals to envy, it is also clear that his views held dangers 
for the powers that be: 
•	 Taking sides in a power struggle and preaching that the 
end justifies any means to remain in power – this makes 
one vulnerable to attacks from the opposition.
•	 Allowing for crime as a justified means to sustain civil 
power surpasses one’s right to freedom of thought, 
speech, information and even academic freedom. 
•	 Loyalty is not to be expected from a supporter who 
believes that the ends justify the means, so Machiavelli’s 
powerful friends might have feared the practice of his 
theories too near to themselves. 
•	 Preaching republican freedoms in an environment in 
which even republicans were often power-manipulators 
was even more dangerous.
•	 Republican governments were often run by powerful 
families acting as political parties – thus a balance-of-
power republicanism, as proposed by Machiavelli, could 
land on hard soil. 
•	 In spite of the progressive decline of the powers of the 
Roman Catholic Church, attacking its power in even a 
nuanced way – as both Machiavelli and Dante Alighieri 
did – was surely quite a dangerous undertaking. This 
Church had, since the 12th century, been pushed onto the 
back foot by oppositional currents such as the Joachimists, 
the Cathars, the Albigensians, the Pre-Reformation and 
the Reformation, the Mendicant Friars (all born within 
its own structures). There was a continuous struggle 
between religious and secular authorities from the summit 
down to the local authorities. The Church showed overt 
sensitivity towards any kind of challenge, as Galilei and 
Descartes experienced even in the seventeenth century. 
Classicism and militarism – Constructing a 
methodology
In the Preface to the Discorsi Machiavelli (1975) claims novelty 
for his method and gives the principles for its operation. This 
we have to read intensively in the light of his methodological 
practices in the Discorsi. Important here is not the novelty 
itself but its hidden sting: a method structured to attack, to 
unmask. Unmasking is also the hidden purposive criterion of 
Pragmatism in the sense that showing the inefficiency of the 
opponent is a requirement in Pragmatist critique: 
Extract 1: Although owing to the envy inherent in man’s nature 
it has always been no less dangerous to discover new ways and 
methods than to set off in search of new seas and unknown 
lands because the generality of mankind are much more ready to 
belittle than to praise another’s actions, none the less, impelled 
by natural desire I have always had to labour, regardless of 
anything, on that which I believe to be for the common benefit 
of all, I have decided to enter upon a new way, as yet untrodden 
by anyone else. 
When, therefore, I consider in what honour antiquity is held, and 
how – to cite but one instance – a bit of an old statue has fetched 
a high price that someone may have it by him to give honour to 
his house and that it may be possible for it to be copied by those 
who are keen on this art ... and when, on the other hand, I notice 
that what history has to say about the highly virtuous actions 
performed by ancient kingdoms and republics, by their kings, 
their generals, their citizens, their legislators, and by others who 
have worn themselves out in their country’s service, is rather 
admired than imitated; nay, is so shunned by everybody in 
each little thing they do, that of the virtue of bygone days there 
remains no trace, it cannot but fill me at once with astonishment 
and grief … in constituting republics, in maintaining states, in 
governing kingdoms, in forming an army or conducting a war, in 
dealing with subjects, in extending the empire, one finds neither 
prince nor republic who repairs to antiquity for examples. 
This is due in my opinion not so much to the weak state to which 
the religion of today has brought the world, or to the evil wrought 
in many provinces and cities of Christendom by ambition 
conjoined with idleness, as to the lack of a proper appreciation of 
history, owing to people failing to realise the significance of what 
they read … Hence it comes about that the great bulk of those 
who read it take pleasure … but never think of imitating them, 
since they hold them to be not merely difficult but impossible of 
imitation, as if the heaven, the sun, the elements, and man had 
in their motion, their order, and their potency, become different 
from what they used to be. 
Since I want to get men out of this wrong way of thinking, I have 
thought fit to write a commentary on all those books of Livy ... It 
will comprise what I have arrived at by comparing ancient with 
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modern events, and think necessary for the better understanding 
of them, so that those who read what I have to say may the more 
easily draw those practical lessons which one should seek to 
obtain from the study of history. (Machiavelli, Disc., Preface, 1–3)
The quote, somewhat lengthy, condenses all the important 
aspects of Machiavelli’s strategy: 
•	 a self-endangering one
•	 the importance of the Classical era for one’s own days
•	 the weakening of people by religion
•	 the importance of comparing old-time virtue with 
present-day vice.
The first important point he makes is that fellow 
Renaissancists appreciate the Classical era for the wrong 
reasons and thus in the wrong way. They were honouring the 
Classics as a bygone era never to be recovered again. Thus 
a component of the novelty of his method would be: how to 
understand the Classical heritage as relevant for the present. 
He felt at home in Romanist Classicism where the security 
of the Roman civil state was of prime importance. The 
Romans lived a competitive life: from the North the 
Germans and the French were threatening; from the South 
the Arabs (Hannibal not to forget). He was a descendant of 
these glorious Romans. Their glory had to be recovered. In 
Italy this striving for Ancient glory remained all through 
the unification movement (Mazzini, Garibaldi, etc.) up 
into the fasces symbolising Fascism. His Romanist heroic 
exemplarism was a militarism reinserted into the Western 
worldview. Western social thought really submerged itself 
into the militaristic aspects of Classicism. 
Hobbes restructured militarism into a view of the human 
being as an individual: to be a warmonger is a strong component 
of being-human. Militarism, combined with the doctrine 
of balance of powers in free competition, became the 
mechanism of progress and of structuring international 
politics. In 18th century Romanist militarism the ideal of the 
balance of powers also became part of republicanism and 
Enlightenment civil religion. Marcuse saw in Kant a liberal 
Lutheran, but not even Kant escaped the deeper militarism 
in his social views, as is clear from his later essays, amongst 
them Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerliche 
Absicht (Kant 1975a; Marcuse 1983:79–94).
In Machiavelli, military Classicism became methodised. 
Militarism, patriotism, and heroism are closely associated 
ideas. He did not work with an abstract history. His was more 
of a genial and heroic type of historiography. Machiavelli’s 
historiographical and political exemplarism was a down-to-
earth one. He lauds the admiration of the classics but laments 
the fact that imitation is neglected. How is it, he asks, that we 
read the classics only for pleasure? 
Different classicisms
Forms of Classicism had been present in the West since 
the Hellenistic and early Christian era. To differentiate 
between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance on the basis 
that the Renaissance was a return to the Classical era is to 
misunderstand a large part of Western history. The Classical 
era has always been present but in limited and ‘mixed’ 
formats, from long before the Renaissance until long after it 
had ended. Early Christianity integrated especially Plato and 
the Stoics into Christian doctrine; scholasticism recovered 
different forms of Aristotelian thought, initiating the search 
for a more pristine Aristotle. In the aftermath of Renaissance 
Classicist and 18th century Neo-Classicist education 
Romanist patriotism was indirectly taught in South African 
schools via history and via Latin at least until a few decades 
ago (which, together with mathematics, was seen as an ‘elite’ 
subject for ‘intelligent’ minds). 
The earlier Renaissance scholars had learnt from the 
Scholastics that being-literate in the originals was important. 
They increased the reading of works from the Classical era 
by expanding literacy. Apart from the Pre-Reformation and 
Reformation, Renaissance authors have been so fascinated 
by the ‘originals’ that they strove for an adoption of these 
pre-Christian originals, literally ‘re-paganising’ vast sections 
of the full cultural range. Not even the Catholic Church was 
spared, for Ancient Occultism was re-introduced in it via the 
Florentine Academy. 
The full spectrum of the classics was recovered in the 
Renaissance, when we find different currents reminiscent of 
Ancient (even pre-Socratic) Greek and Roman culture. One 
has at least to distinguish between a Romanist and a Graecist 
Renaissance Classicism, although one cannot find pure forms 
of the one or the other. Machiavelli’s Romanist militarism 
was but one form of such Classicism. As we shall see, his 
dominantly Romanist outlook was undergirded by Greek 
sources, the most important of which was Aristotle. 
There was a distinct way in which the Renaissance adopted 
the Classical era, namely as:
•	 informative content
•	 models to be imitated
•	 technical plans to be followed. 
But Renaissance Classicism was not the last era of Classicism 
in the West. In the late 17th century and all through the 
18th century another Classicism, called ‘Neo-Classicism’, 
surfaced. It was visible in the arts (e.g. Jacques Louis David) 
and in the attempts to revive republics similar to the Roman 
one (Napoleon using this to become the ‘first consul’ wearing 
a caesarist laurel crown). It was also evident in theorising: 
it is not by accident that Jean-Jacques Rousseau inserted an 
analysis of Ancient constitutions into his Du contrat social (see 
Rousseau 1968); nor that Kant viewed real historiography as 
beginning only with the Greeks (Kant 1975a:48fn). 
Neo-Classicism, though, was ‘neo’ in the sense that it still 
adhered to the Classical as in models, above.
But it derived its technical plans and information from Modern 
science.
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Machiavelli, adopting all three options from older Classicism, 
wanted to draw practical consequences for political 
leadership from the classics, understood in the Renaissance 
way: the classics served him as source of information, also as a 
source of models; then in a certain sense as method.
He claimed that his research method was ‘novel’. But one 
has to measure this novelty against its practical execution. 
Machievelli being a Classicist, the novelty is restricted to how 
he reinterpreted the Classical authors and their methods, 
and partially also in how he restructured their scholarly 
strategies. 
Within the continuity of methodological developments a 
shift was occurring. Not only Machiavelli claimed novelty 
of method; Bacon, Descartes and his contemporaries, Locke, 
Hume, Hegel up to Vico, also made such claims. Scholarly 
method became all-important. 
Scholarly method had to make all the difference – between truth 
versus falsehood, for the sake of good versus bad. Pretending 
that a good method would guarantee insight into the truth 
was quite pretentious and very Western – the equation of 
wisdom and prudence with scholarship. Machiavelli, himself 
a writer on military matters and an active statesman, should 
have known that old books and a good, scholarly method of 
reading do not guarantee good practice. His selection of the 
types of old books (e.g. Livius) already shows that Classicism 
as a method is prejudiced. He too easily slipped into the 
scientistic attitude, probably influenced by Aristotle.
Importantly, within an original Classicism one has to expect 
that a scholarly method will include as normative information 
models and technical approaches from Ancient times. 
Ontology, methodology and 
replication of ancient practice
Aristotle provided Machiavelli with an ontological 
assumption – organismic,4 causal determinism. Given that 
Machiavelli worked historically in a pre-experimental phase, 
the empirical side of his work came from historical events: 
scientism informed by practicism. 
He therefore found it scientifically easy to propagate 
replication of Ancient heroic deeds – the practical could be 
repeated, based on the deterministic belief that the heaven, the 
sun, the elements, and man had in their motion, their order, and 
their potency not at all changed from what they used to be. 
The macrocosmic cycle and the human social cycle are 
similarly repetitive; the human one can also be repeated 
4.‘Organismic’ here stands in contrast to ‘mechanistic’. ‘Organismic’ thinkers are 
‘holists’ and in social terms totalitarians of some kind. They tend to see the whole – 
however it is defined – as having a life and a personality of its own, and as life-giving 
to its parts, of which humankind is the purest imitation of the whole. Organismic 
thinkers tend to be pantheistic and often end up in a social mysticism, in which 
the individual is partly or completely absorbed into the whole. Mechanistic thinkers 
view the universe as a machine, every part of which is seen as replaceable. In social 
contexts they tend to be individualistic and view the social whole – however it is 
defined – as an aggregation of individual contractual choices (see Venter 1997:41ff.). 
There is a tendency to view the most powerful whole as the governing one – after 
the Middle Ages, the state began to occupy this position. 
by wilful engagement initiating a causal chain (such as the 
constitutional cycle discussed in the next paragraph). 
Revised Ancient models: Macrocosmic cycles 
and local balances
Doctrinally speaking, Machiavelli anticipated middle 
Modernity’s absorption of individual behaviour into 
the grand scheme of things. Although one may have the 
appearance of change on a microscopic level, in the grand 
scheme of causal movements, imbalance moves to balance, 
after which over-compensation and re-compensation may 
take place. Kant argued that even though on a micro level, 
we can only see arbitrary (even chaotic) events, on a macro-
level individual actions are part of the aggregate as if the 
individual were a dog on leading strings (1975c:85ff.). Both 
of them imagined a macro-balance that determines history in 
general. Machiavelli (1975) argues:
Extract 2: When I reflect that it is in this way that events pursue 
their course it seems to me that the world has always been in 
the same condition, and that in it there has always been just as 
much good as there is evil, but that this evil and this good has 
varied from province to province. This may be seen from the 
knowledge we have of ancient kingdoms, in which the balance 
of good and evil changed from one to the other owing to changes 
in their customs, whereas the world as a whole remained the 
same. (Machiavelli, Disc., II, 1:5)
Machiavelli was fascinated with the centuries-enduring 
stability of Sparta and Rome and the expansion of Rome into 
a republican empire. Apparently these two states succeeded 
to come-into-step with the stable macrocosmic cycles. With 
Livy he lamented the return of autocracy under the caesars. 
The republican stability was the product, he believed, of a 
special constitutional dispensation: one based on the balance 
of powers. The pendulum movement of republican civility 
described in extract 2 could be fixed by a constitutional 
balance of powers in which the different over-compensations 
were held in check and moderated. (After Newton’s 
equilibrium of gravitation, the idea of a universal automatic 
balance became much more pronounced.)
Machiavelli used the Platonist–Aristotelian doctrines about 
constitutional change as the basic model to explain how such 
a balance could be effected. This made him a real precursor of 
Descartes, who believed that once one knows the causal links 
of nature, one can control it (Descartes 1982:ch. VI). Plato and 
especially Aristotle presented a pendulum-cycle between 
good and bad constitutions. They ‘predicted’ an order of 
succession but they did not indicate technical measures for 
controlling the cycle or offer advice as to how to let it run 
optimally. This was Machiavelli’s (1975) innovation. 
In this latter sense, especially in combination with the idea of 
competitive economic freedom for advantage, Machiavelli had 
already become an early Modern thinker (Disc., II, ii, 9).
Aristotle’s model, as cited by Machiavelli (Disc., I, ii, 1ff.), 
encompassed three oppositional pairs (good versus bad) of 
constitutional dispensations, each succeeding the other in a 
repetitive cycle:
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(I, 1) monarchy, which deteriorates into
(I, 2) tyranny; this creates a reaction amongst good people and 
leads to
(II, 1) aristocracy, which deteriorates into
(II, 2) oligarchy; this leads to revolt amongst the people and a
(III, 1) democracy is established; unlimited freedom leads to
(III, 2) anarchy – this demands strong-handed tactics;
(I, 1) as a consequence, one finds a return to monarchy; 
the whole cycle then repeats itself … (see also Aristotle 1967:III, 7ff.)
The Aristotelian cycle can be presented as a circle in which 
one argues from the point where anarchy slips over into 
monarchy. Monarchy is supposed to be the starting point, 
since small groups of people, such as families, come together 
for security reasons and submit to the leadership of a 
paterfamilias or a similar leader. 
It is, however, not a vertically standing circle with the best at the 
summit and the worst at the bottom (on the circumference 
opposite to the summit): it is a horizontal, flat-surfaced 
circle where the worst is right ‘next’ to the best (monarchy 
being Aristotle’s analogical ideal type of government). 
Once the pendulum of deterioration has run the full circle 
back to anarchy, the original pre-monarchic insecurities 
return – predictably a monarchy is re-established. It is to 
be remembered that Aristotle in particular had no sense of 
a world-beginning like the one in the biblical Genesis. His 
world was one of an eternal cycle of cause and effect; of 
combination and dissolution: these were the effects of the 
monarchic Prime Mover (unknown to the Mover himself).
All histories presented as circles (Hegel or Nietzsche) have 
‘beginnings’ on the circumference. Such beginnings are also 
ends. The linearity of our logical thinking demands a 
beginning and an end. Earthly monarchy, as the Beginning-
End in Aristotle, reflects ontological monarchianism: the First 
Unmoved Mover is also the Final Cause. Aristotle’s cycle was 
a pre-Christian one of unbroken repetition; Machiavelli’s 
cycle sustained this, but with the possibility of creating 
a fairly long term good balance (using conflict as means).5 
According to Machiavelli, an original monarchy is necessary 
for a unitary constitution. Monarchy belongs to the good 
forms in the Aristotelian cycle; the problem is that it does not 
offer long-term stability. It was necessary, at the founding of 
Rome, for Romulus to kill Remus in order to give a unitary 
legal foundation to the city.6
Aristotle did study contemporary ‘empirical’ constitutions 
but he believed that the only real scholarly method was the 
deductive one. He used induction as a way of generating 
5.The cyclical view of history has undergone a further development in Modernity. 
Repristination was again not possible: the linearity of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic 
view of history was too influential to simply be discarded; it was secularised into 
the belief in progress (discussed below with regard to Joachimism and Pico della 
Mirandola). Hegel begins at the top of a vertically standing circle with (the) Idea – 
spiritualistic – moving downwards to Matter at the very bottom and upwards on the 
other side, ending at the same point with Philosophy as Absolute Spirit. Nietzsche 
(1906) followed an inverse route – naturalistic – in a similar circle: upwards from 
living matter to the summit of the Übermensch and down again: ‘eternal recurrence.’
 
6.Here Machiavelli probably gave the discursive basis for the later guiding norm of 
the unity of science with its reductionist consequences still present in Einstein, 
Logical Positivism and surreptitiously so in Pragmatism (and even in 20th century 
Behaviourism with its insistence on a scientific totalitarian control of society. The 
Cartesian metaphor was, amongst other things, that of founding a city on a single 
legal basis (Descartes 1982:ch. II).
abstract universal rules; from this he deduced regularities 
such as the cycle summarised (Machiavelli (Disc., I, ii, 1ff.). 
Induction, for Aristotle, was a necessary pre-scholarly process. 
The later Aristotle of the Analytica posterior (see Aristotle 
1966) considered the ideal deduction to be from affirmative 
causal definitions. The study of constitutions delivered such 
causal premises and one could predictively deduce the ebbs 
and flows and the return to the origin. 
From a methodological point of view the ontological 
presupposition of determinism was an inevitable requirement. 
The Platonist and Aristotelian view of scientific scholarship 
(epistême), reducing all of ‘real’ knowing to deduction 
(whether the first principle is to be found empirically or via 
retro-duction), imposed a ‘naturalistic’ type of historical 
determinism onto those who wanted to take the empirical 
into account from the very beginning. In the interaction 
between scientific requirements and intellectual intentions, 
Machiavelli could not but assume that humankind (at least in 
a holistic sense) functioned as in a fixed process, rather than 
taking historically epoch-making decisions. It is this tradition 
about scientific knowledge that finally forced even Kant to 
turn human freedom into a natural process and to reduce 
historiography to a natural science (Kant 1975a).
Though attached to Aristotle’s model, Machiavelli was not 
a Graecist Classicist but rather a Romanist one. His interests 
were statecraft and warcraft. His surroundings were the 
small princedoms, republics, larger national states coming 
into being, vassals, church properties; the harsh control of 
the popes, cardinals, princes, kings, and feudal lords; and the 
perpetual conflicts between the two great institutions: church 
and state. He was faced with severe political instability and 
constant inter-city wars, each city attempting to annex the 
next one and every king wanting to expand his tax base 
by overrunning a city or two belonging to some or other 
monarch or tyrant, or republican leadership. 
Around him every sovereign political entity probably 
seemed to be in a different phase of the constitutional cycle. 
I read him as wondering: How can one co-ordinate these so as to 
keep all of them in one good phase of the cycle? The situation on 
the ground was probably near anarchic. It was a situation of 
mini-states in tension with one another, within larger, loose 
units.
His real question was: how to establish a viable, stable order in 
which people can thrive. Given his own prejudices, one can 
imagine Machiavelli seeing the only solution to be a tightly 
controlled macro-empire: an imperial republic modelled 
on Ancient Rome with a strong central authority and much 
leeway for local freedoms. In this, he was some three centuries 
ahead of his times in working for a unified Italy. 
Exemplarism and replication
Machiavelli’s was an Aristotelian exemplaristic understanding 
of history. Given Aristotle’s causal model, he could interpret 
the history of geniuses and heroes from Ancient times in very 
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much the same way that Aristotle viewed them as warnings 
and as the way to catharsis (purification) in his doctrine of the 
tragedy. 
In his Ars poetica Aristotle ([1508] 1870; see Aristotle et al. 1977) 
analysed the plot structure of a tragedy. In a specific situation 
the hero errs in thinking and consequently errs in practice. 
The cause–effect wheel is turned (an almost ‘scientific’ 
presentation of the wheel of fortune, whom Machiavelli so 
often blames). Our hero is finally overcome by the inevitable 
(bad) consequences of the initial mistake. An ideal type would 
not have erred. But the hero in a tragedy is almost (i.e. just 
short of) the ideal type; this is why we as audience can identify 
with him or her and experience catharsis (Aristotle 1983). 
Machiavelli’s claim to novelty was warranted by his different 
understanding of the classics. He intentionally attempted to 
transform the way the classics were read, understood and 
used, looking for an imitative understanding, a direct practical 
relevance. As we have seen above, he attempted to extract 
practical value from Aristotle’s view of the constitutional 
cycle, combining this with a practical, exemplaristic 
interpretation of ideal-type thinking, finding exemplars 
in the sense of near-ideal counter-examples: the republics 
of Sparta and of Rome. One was a city state and the other 
an empire; each lasted for about eight centuries from their 
earliest form. 
William James was also asking for the practical effects of an 
idea (see Venter 2013). Both Machiavelli and James had 
a utilitarian approach to theory. However, Machiavelli 
certainly did not, like James much later, reduce meaning 
and truth to practical outcomes. He was near to practicism, 
studying practical events technically with the aim of directly 
imitating or even replicating them.
There is no need to rethink praxis. Good practice follows 
objective cyclical patterns; one can but copy and replicate 
– historical change does not differ from the natural cosmic 
cycles. As stated above: historical praxis provided instances 
of a scientistic, law-guided politicology and historiography. 
How did Sparta and Rome succeed in staying beyond the causal 
links of the constitutional cycle?
‘Exemplary’ reading, political praxis and 
balance of powers
The hermeneutic of ‘exemplary’ reading, intended to recover 
the distant old for the newly new, follows the Aristotelian 
tradition but is clearly updated. Aristotle, though never 
adopting the theory of Ideas or Forms, followed Plato’s method 
of ideal typing: both Plato and Aristotle had been influenced 
by the mathematics of their day. Aristotle concentrated all 
that is ideal in the simplicity of the transcendent divine, the 
First Mover and the Good (Aristotle, Metaphysics XII). 
Finding his starting point in empirical reality, Aristotle had 
to indicate earthly ideal types. These were the supposedly 
excellent in each category. Amongst humans the (analogical) 
earthly ideal types were the exemplary persons, analogues 
of the ideal (God/the Unmoved Mover/the Good). Thus 
the most heroic human being was the one to imitate in war; 
the best theoretician had to be imitated in contemplative 
intellectual work, and so forth. The tragic hero was often an 
example of a not-so-ideal ideal type.
Aristotle did have criteria to identify these ideal human 
beings: they had to have their sub-rational aspects under the 
control of the intellect. This would guide them to the golden 
mean between the two extremes. The golden mean between 
arbitrary discrimination and absolute equality is justice; that 
between cowardice and audacity is courage, and so forth 
(Aristotle, NicE, II).
Machiavelli elaborated on this. His examples were not exactly 
golden mean examples. One could, however, say that he was 
constructing a golden mean between tyranny and anarchy by 
using the positive elements from the constitutional cycle. He 
used examples of power consolidation by the elimination of 
opposition whilst leaving something of the old intact (for the 
people to feel at home and identify with). Instead of playing 
with ideal types or near-ideal types, he was more down to 
earth: he integrated what Aristotle wanted to do separately 
(in a book on comedy) by including the non-ideal (deviant 
leadership) in order to find an ideal balance of power. Livy’s 
history of the Roman republic provided the material for this. 
He searched for cases that were exemplary in serving the 
purpose of state stability under external and internal threats, 
teaching how external threats could be used to quell internal 
unrest. In Rome (the empirical ideal type exemplar), the 
nobility organised a war whenever the plebeians became too 
demanding about actually implementing promised rights, 
sending the plebs out to defend the fatherland against some 
country that was not a threat in the first place; thus the 
empire was expanded. 
Machiavelli’s examples were selected under the guidance of 
the doctrine of the balance of powers – the nobility’s threat-
of-war game balanced their minority power against that of 
the plebeian masses. But this was Machiavelli’s interpretation 
of political history; the doctrine of the balance of powers was not 
Aristotelian. The examples of Rome and Sparta were read 
as showing that stability could be achieved for very long 
periods by establishing a constitutional dispensation that 
combines tradition and innovation in terms of the cycle:
•	 Rome replaced the kings with two consuls, each 
governing monarchically for six months and open to 
prosecution after their year in office. 
•	 It sustained the aristocracy (nobility) in the senate, giving 
them vast powers of legislation and advocacy.
•	 And it expanded participation in an aristocracy by creating 
a limited democracy, allowing for representatives of the 
people, the tribunes. 
These three good elements of the cycle kept one another in balance: 
the consuls would face the wrath of the senate and tribunes 
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if they overstepped the mark; the senate could not do as it 
wished, for the people would take them on, and so forth. 
Once the balance between the good elements is disturbed, 
the cycle returns with the bad elements included. 
Both the presentation of doctrine and the selection of examples 
have a function in the persuasiveness of an argument 
and should not be ignored in an analysis of method. My 
mathematics teacher at school regularly warned against the 
use of special cases to prove a general point. Machiavelli did 
not completely fall into this trap: since the republic of Rome 
lasted for many centuries, he could find many examples of 
different inductions to serve his use of the constitutional 
cycle. On the other hand, when it comes to critical differences 
or similarities, his selection was prejudiced in favour of Rome. 
Every historiographer faces this issue: How long a period is 
long enough to make a deduction and how many examples are 
needed? Even more difficult is: How to select exemplars?
Renaissance hermeneutics
The hermeneutic of ‘exemplary’ reading was not standard 
in Renaissance scholarship. The more popular hermeneutic 
was probably allegorical exegesis (or eisegesis–exegesis), 
with a long history originating in Plato, Philo Iudaeus 
and the Alexandrines, via Augustine up to at least Dante 
Alighieri. The latter, known for his majestic confessional 
poem, Divina commedia (Alighieri [1904] 2012), wrote smaller 
theses on aesthetics and politics. Augustine summarised 
this ‘exemplary’ way of reading, rehearsed below, for the 
generations to come.
 
The tradition of the fourfold meaning
The Manichaeans, Augustine complained, replaced the 
authority of Scripture with that of human reason since they 
had problems understanding certain biblical passages. In 
practice this happened by means of the hypothesis of text 
corruption, to be revised by human rational changes. One did 
not need the hypothesis of text corruption at all, Augustine 
said, if one would but accept that the Bible as a whole was 
transmitted to us in a fourfold meaning: 
The (1) historical meaning was the presentation of the events 
as such; the (2) aetiological meaning clarified and eliminated 
perceived clashes between Old and New Testament; the (3) 
moral meaning was touching on good and bad behaviour; 
the (4) allegorical meaning was the figurative sense behind 
the literal. According to Augustine, Jesus and his disciples 
had also understood the Scriptures in terms of these four 
meanings (Augustine, De utilitate credendi:iii, 6).
My guess is that Augustine’s so-called ‘moral’ meaning, 
combined with the idea of exemplary behaviour, may have 
given some impetus to Machiavelli’s empirical search for 
examples. Aristotle’s own exemplarism was built on a 
strong sensitivity for empirical examples and facts, and a 
morality based upon the balance between the sub-rational 
(‘emotional’) extremes, as guided by the intellect. 
That the maintenance of a good moral life was somehow 
the task of the intellectual in the context of the state was 
an Ancient Greek and Roman totalitarian idea adopted by 
Machiavelli and, since Hobbes, by Modernity. Machiavelli 
himself believed that ‘good’ morals are part of good 
citizenship and statesmanship. This was in fact a return to 
pre-Christian points of view: a recovery of the zooion politicon 
[social living being] philosophical anthropology, as can so 
vividly be seen in Plato’s representation of the court case 
against Socrates – the man who (supposedly) did not believe 
in the gods the state prescribed.7 
Machiavelli transformed his good exemplars into icons and 
role models; the bad ones played the opposite role. ‘Good’ 
and ‘bad’ here, of course, are to be understood in terms of his 
doctrine of ‘virtue’. 
Exemplaristic eisegesis
Machiavelli’s empirical exemplars were chosen to serve a 
purpose. Compared to present-day exemplaristic preaching, 
iconising and role modelling, he attempted no purification 
of heroic action. His purpose was quite different from the 
tradition about such exemplars: he really searched for 
those exemplary cases that served his ethical norms (or lack 
of them). His only criterion was state security in a Roman 
republican format. When talking of ‘virtue’, the interests of the 
patria were always uppermost. 
His way of reading texts was different from, but not unrelated 
to, the more popular mode of allegorical exegesis – a ‘reading-
in-reading-out’. Exemplaristic reading inherited a good deal 
of this ‘reading-in-reading-out’ tradition. In the hierarchy 
of eisegesis–exegesis [an interpretation of a text] one reading 
presupposed the others: the historical or more literal meaning 
has always been presupposed. A moral interpretation of a 
story about Sarah and Hagar could thus not clash with the 
code given in, say, the Ten Commandments. Machiavelli did 
read-in and read-out, but he went much further:
•	 His reading-in-reading-out procedure, ‘heroic exemplary’ 
reading, relinquished these control beliefs inherent in the 
older method of reading. The only correct way to read the 
classics was to search for exemplars of pro-state-security 
and anti-state-security actions.
•	 For the sake of the state, he demanded sacrifice; imitating 
7.Reading in terms of human exemplars has not departed from us as yet:  I have in the 
past year heard two sermons in which the Bible was read in this way: the exemplary 
Jesus. His behaviour at Emmaus (caring for people while not identifying himself) 
was explained in this way; also that of the apostles (Peter and John healing the 
paralysed person). Jesus and the apostles were represented as exemplary in making 
time to look a person in the eyes while keeping their own egos suppressed. In both 
cases the sermons began with empirical examples of recent historical persons who 
have touched other lives in a similar exemplary way.  
Within the secular world, especially politics, we also find this: the ‘iconising’ of 
heroic personalities. The world’s obsessions with persons like Ghandi, Martin Luther 
King, and Nelson Mandela, and the attempts to recover their behaviour (heroicised 
into angelic purity) may count as cases of this. Creating present-day ‘icons’ has traits 
of ‘mythologising’ (or generating divinities). Visiting the Ghandi monument in India, 
one has the distinct feeling of visiting a shrine to some divinity.
The idea of a role model. Celebrities are sometimes punished for transgressions not 
directly linked to the origin of their celebrity status, since they are supposed to be 
‘role models’; young fans might imitate their (bad) behaviour. This was one of the 
complaints against Socrates. Quite often the role-model status is willy-nilly. Role 
models are punished for sinning against a status which they may not have wanted. 
I am not confessing here to double standards on my own side, but criticising double 
standards on the part of ‘public opinion’: sins that ordinary people are not penalised 
for become deadly sins in a ‘role model’.
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the ancient heroes – here the ends will justify the means. 
Note the code inherent in his method: one had to read Livius 
in such a way that specific results would come to the fore – 
results that favour a stable state and highlight the dangers to it. 
This recovery of Ancient state absolutism is the origin of 
Modern state totalitarianism: Bodin, Filmer, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau, the totalitarian ideologies of the French Revolution 
and of the 18th century to the 20th century.
Machiavelli’s Classicism developed the Aristotelian empirical 
heroic–causal way of reading into a hermeneutic of empirical 
exemplarism and counter-example, in a causally deterministic 
sense.
Had he been influenced more by Plato, his historiography 
would have followed a pattern like that of Giambattista Vico 
(Venter 2012b:ch. 5, 4, B1ff., i.e. he would have focused not on 
heroic persons and their causal deeds but rather on an ideal 
transcendent structure in a Universal Spirit or a divine Logos 
[reason]) given flesh by human actions, external differences 
that hide an ideal universal spinal column. 
Changing the way of reading therefore touched not only on 
the heroic deeds but also on what went wrong. Exemplars of 
the ‘wrong’ had to be compared with exemplars of the ‘good’. 
Comparative reading: Heroic exemplarism
Since Ancient times, tradition and the old have had a certain 
authority. The mores maiorum [ancestral custom] were 
important in Ancient Rome. Later authors would often 
backdate their works, ascribing them to earlier authors 
in order to give them authority: well-known examples are 
the Corpus hermeticum and the works of Pseudo-Dionysius 
Areopagita. Even in my own student days, lecturers were 
willing to give authority to a statement by saying: ‘The 
Ancient Greeks had already seen that ….’ Machiavelli argued 
that it is not reasonable to be prejudiced in favour of the past 
and to overlook recent or contemporary advantages, yet he 
still iconised the Ancient (Machiavelli, Disc., II, 1:1ff.).
Directly following the summary of his ontology (in extract 
1 and extract 2), Machiavelli concluded to method (see 
extract 3). By commenting on Livy’s history of Rome, he 
wanted to lead people out of the wrong way of thinking, 
believing it too difficult or impossible to repeat past great 
events. Livy himself had a heroic patriotistic, republicanist 
attitude; this served Machiavelli’s (1975) purpose well:
Extract 3: It will comprise what I have arrived at by comparing 
ancient with modern events, and think necessary for the better 
understanding of them so that those who read what I have to 
say may the more easily draw those practical lessons, which one 
should seek to obtain from the study of history. (Machiavelli, 
Disc., I:Preface) 
Machiavelli wanted to produce a commented reading aimed 
at political praxis. Comparison is his method, such that one 
can see present errors in the light of Ancient exemplars. 
The way he goes about it shows something of the nature 
of comparison (see Venter 2013). For Machiavelli and 
many other Renaissance thinkers comparative values were 
provided by the social setting and the intellectual tradition of 
repristinating Classicism. Machiavelli knew quite well how to 
compare, setting unstable constitutional dispensations from 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance against stable Ancient 
Classical ones. His use of the Aristotelian constitutional cycle 
provided him with a theoretically quite strong instrument 
for selecting points of comparison. But then: How to select the 
critical differences and/or similarities? 
In opposing the supposedly good to the supposedly bad, 
one had to look for difference – critical difference. Similarities 
and differences in a comparison do not carry the same 
weight. Subjective and objective contexts meet here and 
often the subjective context (one’s prejudices) dominates. A 
falsification approach may help to discipline the mind here. 
In Machiavelli, isolating such difference was founded in his 
own idea of virtue and dignity, in tough-minded leadership in 
stabilising a republic. Being a proponent of militarism and 
Classicism, he found the men of his own era lacking virtue. 
Of course the deficiencies were determined in terms of 
implicit valuations. 
Directing his comparison (and the inferences made from 
it) was the romanticising of stable Classical dispensations and 
their heroic defenders. Whereas Aristotle would have made 
the generalisations in terms of constitutions and those who 
executed them well, followed by inferences according to 
Euclidean deductive patterns, Machiavelli played around 
with specific, situational and often personal counter-examples 
in contrast to the impersonations of Ancient good exemplary 
behaviour. He narrates how a contemporary civil society (like 
a city republic) was destabilised by the actions of individual 
leaders, showing these leaders’ mistakes by referring to 
the behaviour of Classical heroic leadership under similar 
circumstances. The specific aspect abstracted here is 
‘political situation’ (guided by ‘stability versus instability’ as 
a criterion). 
A situation is prescriptive: Anankê, the divinity of ‘necessity’ 
(rather than Tyche, the accidental), hides in it. It allows for 
limited options and one has to take the expedient alternative. 
As the Romans said, fortes Fortuna adiuvat (‘Fortune helps the 
courageous’). But one has to show respect for the boundaries 
Fortune sets. In The prince, Machiavelli ([1532] 2011) argued 
that it is necessary for a prince to learn how to do wrong and 
how to hide this; the prince has to know how to act the beast 
as well as the man (Walker 1975:75). (The beastly human 
nature of Hobbes had thus been suggested previously by 
Machiavelli.) He would have found present-day attempts at 
transparency and steps taken against corruption to be totally 
against the general interest and a threat to stability. (The 
echoes of the state security and stability arguments are still 
audible today; in the 18th century, Machiavelli was popular 
reading matter.)
When it is necessary for a politician to exercise a certain 
option, Machiavelli argues, he has to exercise it or suffer 
blame. Soderini faltered by acting Christianly (!): by not 
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doing ‘wrong’ against a hostile group, he was deposed to his 
own and the state’s detriment; this was blameworthy (Disc., I, 
52:2). 
Often, then, a leader has only one option: do! Here Machiavelli 
anticipates Modern activism. Sartre would later make this an 
alternative: if the ‘to-do’ is not responsible, then one’s only 
other option is ‘to-die’: commit suicide! Hobbes would have 
preferred to say: the citizens – not the leaders – are beasts 
(seldom rational) and the state is the active ‘reason’ that has 
to control the beast in the citizen by any means it deems fit. 
Machiavelli had proposed the idea, but he had not made all 
the refined distinctions.
However, the political world was unstable. Much was 
beyond human control. Where nothing human disturbed the 
situation, Machiavelli provided for an option: the moment 
a leader felt safe and at peace, the goddess Fortuna would 
play a trick on his or her comfort. Brother Leader catches a 
cold and dies of pneumonia or is murdered in his bed. His 
empire collapses. Hobbes derived the equality of the sexes 
from such ‘un-Fortunate’ events: Ms Jael, wife of ordinary 
citizen Heber, could tent-peg a sleeping Mr King Sisera 
through his temples – he never woke up (Jdg 4:18, New 
International Version).
Machiavelli’s search for stability in the civil state became a 
rather funnelled spiral in which doctrine and method mutually 
strengthened one another on a cyclical growth path of centuries. 
He left the Western world with the outline of an agenda and a 
procedure to work through the agenda: welfare, well-being, safety 
and peace. Stability (in the first place) supposedly could produce 
all this. 
Machiavelli’s problem with Christianity (later repeated by 
Hobbes and Rousseau) was that it wanted to serve God first 
whilst serving the state, causing tensions and thus instability. 
Christians were so different from what the state needed. 
The fixed flux of being – Machiavelli as proto-
Modern thinker
The influence of Machiavelli on Modern thought may have 
been underestimated; one does not often find references to 
him when studying the great Modern philosophers since 
Descartes. In Book II of the Discorsi (see Machiavelli 1975) 
he stated many ‘factual–normative’ ideas. These, in other 
formats, have guided Modernity ever since. 
In Book II, 1, 4 Machiavelli uses an expression apparently 
quite typical for his own times, yet anticipating Modernity in 
its early Hobbesian format. He says it sometimes does make 
sense to praise the old and to criticise the contemporary: ‘since 
human affairs are ever in a state of flux, they move either 
upwards or downwards’. This expression could be explained 
as some form of the Renaissance idea of: ‘the great vertical 
chain of being’, but then one has at least to recognise, first, 
that the Renaissance produced a variety of such hierarchies 
and, secondly, that they did not simply disappear with the 
advent of Modernity’s horizontalism. 
For example, another prime pre-Modern ‘great-chain’ 
scheme would be that of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 
(1463–1494). Coming from the side of Renaissance Neo-
Platonism and Hermeticism (the Florentine Academy) with 
its homo miraculum [miracle human being] idea, Pico believed 
that humankind was situated in the middle of a hierarchy, 
sharing a divine spark with the upper echelons of the 
hierarchy and materiality with the lower ones. 
The human being has no essence: it can move upwards via 
all the hierarchies of heavenly bodies and angels to become 
unified with God (a ‘positive’ mysticism), or it can move 
downwards to become brutes or plants or even mineral (a 
‘negative’ mysticism). Pico’s concern was with the dignity 
of the human being; Hermeticism provided a theoretical 
avenue to develop this concern. Pico anticipated Modernity’s 
postponement of the human essence. When Modernity 
horizontalised the chain of being in its faith in progress, the 
human being makes its own essence in and through history, 
the summit in Enlightenment terms being the rational and in 
Irrationalist terms being, for example, Sartrean ‘authenticity’. 
In Pico the human being finds its really dignified being at the 
summit. The essence is postponed. 
One of the most serious reasons for Renaissance humanism’s 
Classicism was the lament that scholasticism had left human 
issues aside whilst focusing on logical puzzles. Scholastic 
authors, Renaissance thinkers argued, did not focus on the 
dignity of the human being. Pico attempted to show the way 
to promoting human dignity: verticalistic, upwards mysticism. 
Both forms of mysticism would return in Modernity, but 
then in cyclical or spiral formats, as we can see in Hegel and 
Nietzsche. Note that even though Pico ascribed a kind of 
divinity to humankind and denied any fixed human essence 
(as if anticipating Sartre), he did not make any allowance 
for moving out of the hierarchy in any sideways direction. 
Modernity opted for a sideways motion, then as a horizontally 
upwards gradient in time – the historicising of the ontology 
(Venter 1999).
However, whether a cyclical or a horizontally linear upwards 
gradient is chosen, the really important issue was where to 
begin. Pico started in the middle, allowing only for vertical 
movements. Hegel started at the upper summit, allowing for 
a cyclical movement with the characteristics of both a spiral 
(every cycle enriching the previous) and a circle (the enriched 
end is the beginning). Nietzsche, following Turgot (the 
chemistry of his own days and the cyclical thinking ascribed 
to ‘Zoroaster’), began at the lowest turning point of an upright 
circle. Hobbes took his point of departure at the bottom, 
allowing only for a vertical movement: either thumbs up or 
thumbs down. So did Marx, but only horizontally upwards. 
The point of departure determined the character of the whole 
movement. It was very difficult for a Humanist to recover the 
human from the plant or the brute once one had taken the point 
of departure on the ‘natural’ side; thence dialectical materialism. 
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v78i2.62http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 13 of 17
Pico died (in 1494) at the young age of 33; Machiavelli was 
born some 5 years later. The latter was a contemporary 
of Luther and John Calvin, although he does not show 
knowledge of their reforms. Machiavelli thus worked in the 
atmosphere of Renaissance humanism, focusing on human 
affairs and its ups and downs, but (as stated above) in a very 
down-to-earth way, prefiguring the naturalist starting points 
in Hobbes, Turgot, Kant, Marx, Darwin and so many others. 
Analogical to the Aristotelian constitutional cycle, he viewed 
human civil history as moving through cycles of virtuosity: 
Extract 4: When I reflect that it is in this way that events pursue 
their course it seems to me that the world has always been in 
the same condition, and that in it there has always been just as 
much good as there is evil, but that this evil and this good has 
varied from province to province. This may be seen from the 
knowledge we have of ancient kingdoms, in which the balance 
of good and evil has changed from one to the other owing to 
changes in their customs, whereas the world as a whole has 
remained the same. The only difference is that the world’s virtue 
first found a home in Assyria, then flourished in Media and later 
in Persia, and at length arrived in Italy and Rome. And if, since 
the Roman Empire there has been no other which has lasted, 
and in which the world’s virtue has been centred, one none the 
less finds it distributed among many nations where men lead 
virtuous lives. … the Francs, … the Turks … and today all the 
peoples of Germany. … (Machiavelli, Disc., II, ii, 5)
Note the quasi-Modern discursive humanistic concentration 
of the world in humankind: twice within a few lines he uses 
the expression, ‘the world’s virtue’. This virtue is (ideally) 
concentrated in an imperial civilisation of a republican 
kind. In a world-historical pendulum movement such 
concentrations of virtue move from site to site, sometimes 
(ideally) centralised, in other eras dispersed; at times 
the ‘good’ dominates, then again the ‘bad’. Humankind, 
however, does have the ability to stretch the eras of the good 
by stabilising civil society, using its inherent laws of power 
balance. 
After Machiavelli, this secular concentration of the world, 
or more specifically its meaning, in humankind would 
remain a part of Western self-consciousness. In initiating 
globalisation, the Renaissance would become the starting 
point of Eurocentric world-historiography and hegemony, 
with Machiavelli’s new-look historiography surely one of 
the most influential directives for a Modern Humanistic 
hermeneutics of history. 
Machiavelli believed that ‘virtue’ (that is, stable statehood) 
was shifting from one civilisation to another. Although he 
did accept city states as one of the good Aristotelian forms, 
his great admiration was for republican empires. The ups 
and downs of empires and the shifts from one civilisation 
to another – this is Machiavellian historiography. And, 
in some sense, by horizontalising, it also became Modern 
historiography. One has but to read Vico, Kant and Hegel on 
history to see the return of Machiavellian themes. 
Importantly, however, in Machiavelli’s verticalism one 
could move with simple shifts of the balance from good 
to evil. Within the Modern faith in progress the rise and 
collapse of civilisations and empires was difficult to include, 
since it factually denied progress. Theoretically, this 
was managed by metaphorising Bonnet’s idea of natural 
catastrophes. Bonnet, an early evolutionary biologist, in 
his later career argued that within every female of any 
species miniatures exist. Through catastrophes such as the 
legendary great flood all the adults of the species had been 
decimated whilst the miniatures moved one rank higher: 
plants became animals; animals became human – next, 
humans will become angels …
It is almost as if Bonnet had adopted Pico’s hierarchy 
and evolutionised the mystical way from the bottom end 
horizontally upwards. Enlightenment believers in inevitable 
progress argued that civilisations and empires grow to a 
summit, then decline, very much like any individual living 
being. When on the decline, a miniature of such a civilisation 
is already forming in the womb of the old. Catastrophe 
overtakes the old and the new outgrows it to a higher summit. 
If one construes a graph tangential to the successive summits, 
this will show progress. This is the half- cycle historiography 
referred to above.
Another interesting point in extract 4 is the absence of any 
reference to the Jews. Machiavelli, surrounded by forms 
of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, did not see any cultural 
importance in them. Kant at least inserted the Jews into 
history after Thucydides (Kant 1975a:48fn). Machiavelli’s 
perspective was so heavily statist and militaristic that he 
completely overlooked the vast influence of the Jews (and 
Arabs) on Western culture. After the Romans, the Francs are 
mentioned, even the Turks. But what image did Renaissance 
Europeans have of Turkish civilisation? In Hegel one can 
still read the reminiscences of Machiavelli’s idea of pockets 
of virtue left amongst the Germans. These are not the only 
anticipations of Modernity. Machiavelli quite explicitly 
anticipates the Hobbesian starting point in the hierarchy: 
humankind’s insatiable desires and the necessity to balance 
these within the context of the state:
Extract 5: Furthermore, human appetites are insatiable, for by 
nature we are so constituted that there is nothing we cannot 
long for, but by fortune we are such that of these things we can 
attain but few. The result is that the human mind is perpetually 
discontented, and of its possessions is apt to grow weary. This 
makes it find fault with the present, praise the past, and long 
for the future; though for its doing so no rational cause can be 
assigned. Hence I am not sure but that I deserve to be reckoned 
amongst those who thus deceive themselves if in these my 
discourses I have praised too much the days of the ancient 
Romans and have found fault with our own. Indeed, if the virtue 
which then prevailed and the vices which are prevalent today 
were not as clear as the sun, I should be more reserved in my 
statements lest I should fall into the very fault for which I am 
blaming others .… (Machiavelli, Disc., II, ii, 7)
In these few sentences so many anticipations of Modernity 
reveal themselves:
•	 The basis of capitalist theory has been the discrepancy 
between human desire and the means to satisfy it. This 
Machiavellian belief in the infinity of desire versus the 
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relatively limited means to satisfaction has been the 
cornerstone of explanatory theories in economics ever 
since.
•	 The perpetual discontent with the present is another 
theme to be found all through Modernity. In Hobbes it 
is represented as the perpetual striving to be the winner 
and to take all that one can. Hobbes, like Machiavelli, 
viewed the world in terms of alternatives. After Hobbes, 
however, with the advent of the faith in progress, the 
alternatives became successive phases of history: the era 
of desire was supposed to be the driving force of progress 
towards the age of reason. 
•	 Machiavelli has an explanation for the discontent with 
the present: desire and boredom bring both a longing for 
‘paradise lost’ and a hope for more, better or different 
in the future. This presentation of history remained all 
through Modernity in many revised forms, the faith in 
progress being the primary example. So much of these few 
sentences reappear in, for example, Kant’s Mutmässlicher 
anfang der menschengeschichte (1975c) – a commentary on 
the narrative of human origins in the biblical Genesis. 
•	 His doctrine of the insatiability of desires combined 
with the doctrine of balance of powers became the 
source of the Modern view of suffering into a source of 
progress. Desire causes conflict; conflict causes progress. 
Conflict and competition also cause an intra-civil and 
international balance of powers and thus perpetual peace 
(Kant 1975a, 1975b, 1975c). However, at least since Kant, 
doubts have been expressed about the overspending of 
resources for the sake of the arms race; Bertha von Suttner 
(1889) would almost viciously attack this. Machiavellian 
militarism finally did not expand virtue, but brought 
immeasurable suffering. 
In his introduction to his standard translation of the 
Discorsi, Father Walker refers to Machiavelli’s analysis of the 
distribution of ‘virtue’ (citizens’ involvement in the military) 
amongst peoples in the Art of war (II, B, 300b) (see Walker 
1975:26ff.). Machiavelli there theorises that where one has 
many states one finds a mutual security threat; thus there 
will be many more military preparations, skills and courage 
than where there are only few states. As the Roman Empire 
expanded, such virtue went into decline since the external 
threats were diminished. Yet Machiavelli still believed 
in the sensibility of an empire; a divided Italy remained 
unacceptable. 
Kant, however, himself a proponent of the doctrine that 
mutual threat leads to progress, had to lament that the 
continuous preparation for war had become an obstruction 
to enlightenment (in his Idee zu einer allgemeine Geschicte …, 
Kant 1975b:45; Siebenter Satz). By then the idea of a civil, 
patriotic, enlightenment education had established itself (as 
proposed by Rousseau and Quesnay and practised by the 
French Revolutionaries [Venter 2012b:ch. 5]).
Critique of Christianity
Much has already been said about Machiavelli’s attitude 
towards his own days, and especially the lack of good 
political leadership. Machiavelli treaded carefully, knowing 
that there was a pope, a cardinal or even a favour-seeking 
prince looking over his shoulder, but the hidden dagger had 
a very specific target: Christianity. Right at the beginning of 
the Discorsi (see Machiavelli 1975) he had already suggested 
that religion had weakened society and that Christendom 
had brought many evils, but immediately moderated this 
by saying that the real reasons for the weakness of his times 
were the lack of a proper appreciation of Ancient history 
and the practical potential in imitating it. Having seduced 
the reader to follow his arguments into the second book, he 
makes a complete about-turn, in fact blaming Christianity for 
the weaknesses of his days.
Ancient virtues versus present vices
Surely the expression ‘if the virtue which then prevailed and 
the vices which are prevalent today were not as clear as the 
sun’ (in extract 5) is of prime importance. In this context, 
he argues his case at length: although so many are guilty of 
exaggerating the virtues of the past and overreacting against 
the evils of the present – given many factors such as age 
and appetite – he could not see himself as guilty of such a 
distortion: 
Extract 6: If one asks oneself how it comes about that peoples 
of old were more fond of liberty than they are today, I think 
the answer is that it is due to the same cause that makes men 
today less bold than they used to be; and this is due, I think, to 
the difference between our education and that of bygone times, 
which is based on the difference between our religion and the 
religion of those days. For our religion, having taught us the 
truth and the true way of life, leads us to ascribe less esteem to 
worldly honour. Hence the gentiles, who held it in high esteem 
and looked upon it as their highest good, displayed in their 
actions more ferocity than we do. This is evidenced by many 
of their institutions. To begin with, compare the magnificence 
of their sacrifices with the humility that characterises ours. The 
ceremonial in ours is delicate rather than imposing, and there 
is no display of ferocity or courage. Their ceremonies lacked 
neither pomp nor magnificence, but, conjoined with this, were 
sacrificial acts in which there was much shedding of blood and 
much ferocity, and in them great numbers of animals were 
killed. Such spectacles, because terrible, caused men to become 
like them. Besides, the old religion did not beatify men unless 
they were replete with worldly glory: army commanders, for 
instance, and rulers of republics. Our religion has glorified 
humble and contemplative men, rather than men of action. It 
has assigned as man’s highest good humility, abnegation, and 
contempt for mundane things, whereas the other identifies it 
with magnanimity, bodily strength, and everything else that 
tends to make men very bold. And if our religion demands that 
in you there be strength, what it asks for is strength to suffer 
rather than strength to do bold things. (Machiavelli, Disc., II, ii, 6) 
Machiavelli directed the critical side of his method at the 
dominant Western religion of his days: ‘Christendom’ (in 
casu Catholicism). He complained about evils wrought by 
ambition, idleness, but mostly about not appreciating what 
they had been reading about the Ancient situation. The point 
he was trying to make was similar to that of William James 
much later: Christian education produces tender-minded people – 
actually, weaklings. The blood and gore of Ancient sacrifices, 
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the pomp, the striving for honour, the ferocity – all of these 
make for ferocious people (that is: valuable citizens).
Honour and glory, in Ancient times, were but military and 
civil, not aimed at the humble, the meek or the spiritual 
world. Note here the importance of:
•	 action, bodily strength and boldness rather than strength in 
suffering 
•	 driven action rather than contemplation. 
It is as though he used ‘virtue’ in terms of its philological roots: 
virtus (from vir = man) in Classical Latin meant: ‘manliness’, 
‘manly excellence’. This was generalised into excellence, 
capacity, worth, goodness, virtue. In human beings: virtus animi, 
corporis (of ‘spirit’ and ‘body). Even in animals, inanimate or 
abstract things: of horses, of herbs, or of oratory. Especially 
however: (1) moral excellence, virtue … (2) valour, bravery, 
courage (Simpson 1966). Machiavelli’s idea of virtue seems to 
have encompassed all these Classical moments, focused in 
the republic. The ‘manliness’ in ‘virtue’ was recovered in the 
Fascist idea of human ‘dignity’ (Venter 2002:352ff.). 
Worldview, religion, and patriotism as primary 
virtue
Machiavelli’s comparison of the Ancient with his own times 
was thus skewed in favour of the Ancient for a very particular 
reason, rooted in his worldview: his love for the state and the 
ferocity, manliness, and military skills needed to lead it and 
serve it. The Catholic Church hierarchy and Scholasticism 
had failed Italy, had proven Christianity (narrowed down to 
institutional power relationships) useless. 
His humanism was the precursor of that of Hobbes: the 
perpetual striving for glory, wealth and honour. Yet he 
shows very little of Hobbes’s individualistic tendencies with 
regard to the natural state. Being pre-Cartesian, he was not as 
conscious of the opposition between mechanistic animality 
versus rationality (in its civil form). The Modern dialectic of 
individual plurality versus collective unity did not yet surface 
clearly in Machiavelli’s works: his focus was on leadership, 
citizenship and the stability of the state. 
His whole methodology, that is: (1) the way he used Aristotle’s 
constitutional cycle, (2) his way of reading Ancient texts, 
and (3) the aims carrying his comparisons, was focused on 
this: to show Christianity in the wrong, in fact, as the enemy of 
greatness, patriotism, of the very world’s virtue.
Italy, according to Machiavelli, was in bad shape; quite 
unstable and anarchic. The reasons for this, as Walker 
(1975:26) notes, were (1) its divisions and (2) the decline of 
military discipline. Machiavelli blamed the Christian religion 
for both: 
•	 In so many places he blames the papacy for Italy’s 
divisions. He did not necessarily reject a papal empire: the 
problem was exactly that the pope was not strong enough 
to form an empire, yet strong enough to pose a threat to 
every secular authority. 
•	 Secondly, as he states in the Art of war (Walker 1975:27), 
the Christian religion is too kind to those defeated. In 
Ancient times, large numbers of the defeated would be 
killed; some would be in jail for long periods, cities would 
be destroyed down to the ground, property taken as 
spoils, and so forth. This did not happen after Christianity 
became the dominant religion. This means that people can 
afford being defeated in war and thus discipline collapses. 
His theory that many states threatening one another 
promoted ferocity and thus virtue fell flat in the face of 
these kind Christians. The second example is the action 
of a good leader who had been all too good. Soderini, for 
example, was quite constitutional – all too honest – and so 
had no way of remaining in power once the Medici began 
to undermine him (Disc., I, 52:2–3). Savonarola is blamed 
for not inciting his mob of followers to violence. Both of 
them had established fine constitutions, yet both of them 
failed as statesmen because they had been so very nice:
Extract 7: He who reads the Bible with discernment will see 
that, before Moses set about making laws and institutions, 
he had to kill a great number of men who, out of envy and 
nothing else, were opposed to his plans. The need for this was 
clearly recognised by Friar Girolamo Savonarola and also by 
Piero Soderini, the Gonfalonier of France. … [Savonarola’s] 
sermons were full of indictments … against … those who 
were envious and were opposed to his ordinances. The other 
believed that his goodness, the favour of fortune, and his 
beneficence toward all, in time would extinguish envy. … 
he thought he would be able to get the better of those whom 
through envy were opposing him, without either scandal, 
violence or disturbance. What he failed to realise was that 
time waits for no man, that goodness alone does not suffice, 
that fortune is changeable, and that malice is not placated 
by gifts. So that both these men were ruined, and in both 
cases their downfall was due to their not knowing how, or 
not being able, to overcome envy. (Disc., III, 30:4)
Even Moses was subjected to an ‘exemplary’ reading; the 
textual context is overlooked. Was Machiavelli in some 
sense the author of the later combinations of the national 
with the Christian? I am not sure, but given Modernity’s 
secular, state-absolutist patriotism after the Romanist end of 
the French Revolution and its concordats with the Church 
– see the statues on the sides of the entrance to Sacre Coeur 
in Paris – one might think that Machiavelli’s Romanist 
reading of the Bible may have given some direction to this. 
In the environment of the French Revolution some European 
countries, the United States of America, and the Afrikaners 
in South Africa became fervently patriotic and republicanist. 
Machiavelli’s discourse would still be echoed in the late 18th 
century, when Adam Smith, the real builder of capitalist 
theorising, argued that beneficence was not necessary to 
establish a stable society; competitive exchange alone would 
do the job. Father Walker (1975:29ff.) views Machiavelli’s 
approach as an utterly pagan view, arguing that Christianity 
helped to pacify Europe and that the final advent of 
international organisations for peace have a Christian root. 
Modern Humanists, such as Hobbes and Voltaire, had the 
opposite view of Christianity. 
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Whatever the truth about Christianity, Machiavelli carefully 
construed a method that puts it (almost singularly) in the box of 
the accused.
 
Not only, thus, was he a precursor of Hobbes, but surely also 
of Nietzsche. Though Nietzsche remained in the mould of 
minority elitism and Machiavelli stood nearer to collectivism, 
their ideas of heroic action, desire for power and denigration 
of Christian meekness are similar enough. 
One also needs to keep in mind in this context that for all his 
republicanism, Machiavelli was also the author of The prince 
(see Machiavelli [1532] 2011). His sense of the importance 
of ferocious leadership was very strong, and ferocious 
leadership included preserving unity and stability in the 
empire or princedom at any cost. Hobbes had similar views 
on state leadership; as far as he was concerned, one had to 
honour Caesar rather than God for one’s own advantage, 
because Caesar reigns in God’s very own kingdom (Hobbes 
1946, Bk III: Of a Christian Commonwealth). The greatest of all 
evils, Hobbes believed, was civil war.
 
All is fair in love and war
The ancient Romans had a saying: When arms rattle, rights are 
invalid. The balance of power model is in fact a perpetual arms 
race; a perpetual suspicion of the ‘other’; it perpetually sets 
justice, fairness, love (agapé/caritas) beyond reach. A statue of 
a soldier in full armour on horseback (somewhere in Spain), 
with wife and children clinging to the horse’s legs, broken 
down in pain and fear of never seeing daddy again, says 
it all. Living in a perpetual suspicion of the other, working 
in an environment of artificially imposed competition at 
every level, is living a life of broken relationships. Since the 19th 
century, one of the outcomes of Machiavellianism has been 
the theme of a necessary alienation. 
Machiavelli’s repristination of Rome constituted a recovery 
of Caesarism. He himself warned that the worst kinds of 
oppression come from a republic turned oppressive, for, given 
its stability, it is not easy to overturn it. Was it accidental that, 
some centuries later, Voltaire ([1738] 1992) would represent 
Newton as a Logos and himself wearing a Caesar laurel crown 
(the frontispiece of his Éléments de la philosophie de Newton). 
And soon after that a first consul, wearing the Christian 
symbols of justice, would crown himself, standing upright 
instead of kneeling before a cardinal, with the laurel crown 
of a Caesar? He promised to repair the broken relationships 
of his republic; instead he destroyed hundreds of thousands 
of European lives.
Machiavelli was early-Modern and late-Renaissance, a 
transitional figure. He reintroduced imperialism, enmity 
towards care and kindness, made the courage to ‘love one’s 
enemy’ into a laughing stock; actually took his followers in 
European leadership (apparently even Frederick the Great of 
the German empire) back to tribalist vengefulness: two eyes 
for an eye. 
Ideologues will sacrifice those in their power for their 
own cause, which is always a cause to save humankind 
from its present misery on the basis of some intellectual’s 
predilections. Machiavelli was a proto-ideologue, transforming 
his own local cause – the glory and unity of Italy – into a universal 
virtue. Ferocity of leadership – this was his confession – was 
necessary. It did have an immanentist religious meaning, as 
he himself tells us: the Ancient peoples did not beatify those 
who suffered in humility, but those who led ferociously as 
generals or statesmen. From an exemplaristic perspective, he 
preferred the blood and gore of Ancient sacrifices above little 
pieces of bread and one sip of wine, or the smell of burning 
herbs in the Catholic Church. 
He developed a scholarly method of interpretation, which 
does not even contain a sprinkling of searching for wie es 
eigentlich gewesen sei [how it actually was], to show how 
virtuous Ancient paganism was vis-à-vis the vices – he 
does use this word – of the Christianity of his day. It was 
a methodology of exemplaristic reading, seeking for role 
models and icons. The criterion for the selection of such 
Ancient icons was ‘virtue’. 
One could be at ease if Machiavelli’s approach was but a 
once-off deviation in the history of Western scholarship. 
However, it became part and parcel of Modernity. It is not 
about defending the real outrages committed by Christians. 
It is about developing a scholarly method to single out one 
group to blame it for all the world’s woes and to present 
another group as the really good. Voltaire would explicitly 
repeat such a methodology, whilst blaming Christianity 
for the opposite reasons (atrocities), and thus in fact ascribe 
such goodness to the Classical era as Machiavelli blamed 
Christianity for. Vis-à-vis James’s late-ideological formalism, 
Machiavelli produced a proto-ideological methodology in a 
transitional anticipation of mature Modern ideologies. 
Acknowledgements
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no financial or personal 
relationship(s) that may have inappropriately influenced 
him in writing this article.
References
Alighieri, D., [1904] 2012, La divina commedia di Dante Alighieri, Repressed Publishing 
LLC., Indiana.
Aristotle, 1952, The ethics of Aristotle, transl. and intro. J.A.K. Thomson, Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex.
Aristotle, 1961, The metaphysics, transl. H. Tredennick, Harvard University Press, 
London.
Aristotle, 1966, Posterior analytics. Topica, transls. H. Tredennick & M.A. Forster 
(eds.), Harvard University Press, London.
Aristotle, 1967, The politics, transl. and intro. T.A. Sinclair, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 
Aristotle, Horace, Longinus, Dorsch, T.S. (transl.), 1977, Classical Literary Criticism: 
Poetics/Ars Poetica/On the Sublime, Penguin Books, New York.
Aristotle, 1983, ‘On the art of poetry’, in T.S. Dorsch (ed.), Classical literary criticism, 
n.p., Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex.
Aristotle, 2007, The Nicomachean ethics, Filiquarian Publishing LLC., Minneapolis.
Augustine, 1891, De utilitate credendi, F. Tempsky, Leipzig.
Descartes, R., 1982, Discours de la méthode, Hatier, Paris.
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v78i2.62http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 17 of 17
De Saint-Simon, H., 1825, Nouveau Christianisme, Bureau du Globe, Paris.
Hobbes, T., 1946, Leviathan, or the matter, form and power of a common 
wealth, ecclesiastical and civil, Blackwell, Oxford.
James, W., 1913, Pragmatism: A new name for old ways of thinking. Popular lectures 
on philosophy by William James, Longmans Green, London. 
Kant, I., 1975a, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen geschichte in weltbürgerlicher absicht’, 
in H. Reiss (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant werke in zehn bänden, Bd. 9, Schrifen zu 
anthropologie, geschichtsphilosophie, politik und pädagogik, pp. 33–50, Erster 
Teil, Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaft, Darmstadt.
Kant, I., 1975b, ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist aufklärung?’, in H. Reiss 
(Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant werke in zehn bänden, Bd. 9. Schriften zu anthropologie, 
geschichtsphilosophie, politik und pädagogik, pp. 53–61, Erster Teil, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaf, Darmstadt.
Kant, I., 1975c, ‘Mutmasslicher anfang der menschengeschichte’, in H. Reiss 
(Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant werke in zehn bänden, Bd. 9. Schristen zu anthropologie, 
geschichtsphilosophie, politik und pädagogik, pp. 85–102, Erster Teil, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaft, Darmstadt.
Machiavelli, N., [1532] 2011, The prince, SoHo Books, New York
Machiavelli, N., 1975, The discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli (Disc.), R&KP, London/
Boston. 
Marcuse, H., 1983, From Luther to Popper, Verso, London/New York.
Nietzsche, F.W., 1906, Zur genealogie der moral. Aus dem nachlass 1885-1886. 
Nietzsches werke, taschen-ausgabe, Bd VIII. Kroner, Leipzig.
Overduin, J., n.d., Hel en hemel van Dachau, 4th edn., Kok, Kampen.
Rousseau, J.J., 1968, Du contrat social, transl. M. Cranston, Penguin, New York.
Simpson, D.P., 1966, s.v. ‘virtus’, in New Latin dictionary, Cassell Publishers Ltd, 
London, n.p. 
Stoker, H.G., 1970, Oorsprong en rigting II, Tafelberg-Uitgewers, Kaapstad.
Venter, J.J., 1997, ‘Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism’, 
International Journal for Ultimate Reality and Meaning 20(1), 41–60.
Venter, J.J., 1999, ‘”Modernity”: The historical ontology’, Acta Academica 31(2), 18–
46. 
Venter, J.J., 2002, ‘Human dignity in weakness – Gabriel Marcel’s conception of human 
dignity (versus Mussolini and Skinner)’, Analecta Husserliana 74(1), 351–372.
Venter, J.J., 2012a, Ontmoet ’n personae genaamd ‘Natuur’. Vroeg-Moderne konsepsies 
van die natuurwet. Natuurlik, alte BO-natuurlik, Vraagteken, Potchefstroom.
Venter, J.J., 2012b, Die natuur as persoon-god; Die mens as ding-god; Die wet as 
omni-god: Kopstaan Humanisme van fisio-krasie tot positiwisme, Vraagteken, 
Potchefstroom.
Venter, J.J., 2013, ‘Pragmatism attacking Christianity as weakness – Methodologies 
of targeting’, Koers – Bulletin for Christian Scholarship 78(2), Art. #61, 16 pages. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/koers.v78i2.61
Voltaire, [1738] 1992, Éléments de la philosophie de Newton, Chez Etienne Ledet & 
Compagnie, Amsterdam.
Von Suttner, B., 1889, Das maschinenalter, Ghabeliz, Zürich.
Walker, L.J., 1975, The discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli, R&KP, London/Boston.
